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Abstract
How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape
combatants' coercive strategies? Conventional wisdom expects civilian victimization
to backre, as a security-minded public \balances" against the side posing the greatest
threat to its livelihood and survival. Yet combatants often expect a terrorized popula-
tion to do the opposite, \bandwagoning" with those most willing and capable to inict
harm. Using an epidemic model of popular support dynamics, I explore the logic of
balancing and bandwagoning in irregular civil war. I argue that when civilian strategy
is clearly communicated to combatants, civilians are always better o balancing, and
combatants are better o avoiding punishment. When civilian choice is not observed,
the balancing equilibrium breaks down and patterns of violence depend on the local
balance of power. The model's results challenge the view that selective violence is
most common in areas of incomplete control. Due to uncertainty over civilian behav-
ior, violence in both divided and perfectly-controlled areas can occur in equilibrium,
inicting great costs on civilians. I compare these predictions against the historical
record of Soviet counterinsurgency in Western Ukraine, using new micro-level data
from the declassied archives of the Soviet secret police.
Department of Government, Harvard University. I am grateful to Robert Bates, William Bossert, Jeff
Friedman, Andrew Radin, Brandon Stewart, Dustin Tingley, three anonymous reviewers and seminar par-
ticipants at MIT, Yale, Harvard and the Association for the Study of Nationalities for helpful conversations
and feedback on earlier versions of this model. All remaining errors are my own.
1How do civilians respond to violence in civil war, and how do these responses shape com-
batants' coercive strategies? Irregular intrastate war typically involves a violent competition
for the support of the population.1 To the side able to secure it, popular support facilitates
the extraction of provisions, tributes and taxes, and generates a supply of military recruits,
administrative personnel and informants. The larger this pool of resources, the easier it
becomes to sustain military operations and build the institutions of a sovereign state. For
civilians, however, choosing sides is risky business. Cooperation with insurgents invites pun-
ishment by the government, and cooperation with the government invites punishment by
insurgents.2 Combatants make strategic choices based on expectations of how civilians will
respond to this punishment: by \balancing" against the side that inicts the most costs, or
by \bandwagoning" with it. When civilians balance, the violent interaction becomes a race
to the bottom: victory will go to whichever side can minimize civilian costs. When civilians
bandwagon, the interaction becomes a race to the top: victory will go to the side willing to
hurt civilians the most. In this sense, bandwagoning is inecient: it creates incentives for
the escalation of punishment, increasing the human and material costs of war. If security-
seeking civilians are always better off by balancing, why would combatants ever risk driving
a terrorized population into the arms of the enemy?
Using an epidemic model of popular support dynamics, I explore the logic of balanc-
ing and bandwagoning in civil war, and the incentives these civilian strategies present for
combatants. I argue that punishment can be avoided only when civilian strategy is read-
ily observable. When civilian choice is uncertain, several patterns of violence are likely to
emerge. Two-sided violence occurs where the initial balance of power is evenly divided.
One-sided violence occurs where the balance is asymmetric.3 Where one side has dominant
but incomplete control, violence by the weaker combatant is more likely. Where one side
1An irregular war is dened as an organized armed conict, characterized by a \dearth of large-scale
direct military confrontations ::: and the absence of frontlines" (Kalyvas, 2005, 91). The centrality of the
population to combatant strategy in irregular war is stated succinctly by the U.S. Army's Counterinsur-
gency Field Manual 3-24: \Popular support allows counterinsurgents to develop the intelligence necessary
to identify and defeat insurgents" (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006, 1-29).
2Punishment is here defined as any use of selective (Kalyvas, 2006, 12) or direct (Balcells, 2011, 399-
400) violence: individual or collective arrests or executions of suspected opponents, carried out with light
weapons on the basis of private information provided by civilians. Although selective violence can be highly
inaccurate in practice, depending on combatants' ability to identify opponents (Kalyvas, 2006, 189-191), this
definition excludes generally indiscriminate forms of violence like area bombardment and cordon-and-search.
Cooperation is defined as the provision of information or other forms of support (i.e. material, financial) to
help locate a suspected opponent, or otherwise assist in her capture or execution (Kalyvas 2006, 174-176,
Balcells 2011, 399-400).
3Territorial control (or sovereignty) is here defined as the ability to extract resources for war-making (e.g.
information, tributes, taxes) from a population (Tilly, 1985, 181).
1has fully consolidated control, violence by the stronger combatant is more likely. These
propositions challenge the view that selective violence is most common in areas of incom-
plete control (Kalyvas, 2006, 2008b). Due to the uncertainty of civilian behavior, selective
violence in both divided and perfectly-controlled areas can occur in equilibrium, high risks
of collateral damage notwithstanding. I compare these predictions against the stylized facts
of Soviet counterinsurgency in Western Ukraine, using new micro-level data from the declas-
sied archives of the Soviet secret police.
Civilian victimization in war has been the subject of a growing volume of theoretical and
empirical research, although deep divisions remain over whether such violence suppresses
enemy support or inames it. The conventional wisdom is that killing civilians is usually
counterproductive (Pape 1996; Arregu n-Toft 2001; Francisco 2004; Abrahms 2006; Saxton
and Benson 2008; Kocher et al. 2011, and also Christia 2008). Civilian targeting can compel
an insecure public to withdraw its support and side with the opposition, \balancing" against
the biggest threat to civilian survival. A classic example of this phenomenon can be found
in Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia, where German reprisals against civilians alienated the local
population and facilitated partisan recruitment (Hehn, 1979; Arregu n-Toft, 2003). More
recently, retired General Stanley McChrystal articulated the balancing perspective in his
May 2010 statement that U.S. forces in Afghanistan should exercise \courageous restraint"
to avoid civilian casualties.4 If balancing is the dominant response to collateral damage,
combatants keen on securing civilian cooperation should, as a rule, avoid escalating their
use of punishment. If high rates of violence do take place, they will generally be a result of
some miscalculation or erroneous assumption about civilian choice (Kalyvas, 2006, 162-65).
This view has been disputed by a parallel body of research on cases where repression and
mass killing contributed to military success (Hibbs, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Stoll, 1993; Downes,
2006, 2007; Lyall, 2009, 2010). In this perspective, civilians can be compelled to support the
biggest killer, \bandwagoning" with the side that shows itself willing and capable of inicting
great physical harm. The hanging courts and concentration camps used by the British during
the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya are sometimes cited in this context: as crude, but eective
deterrents against support for rebels (Peters, 2007). The bandwagoning perspective was
also apparent in Muammar Qaddafi's vow in February 2011 to track down and kill Libyan
protesters \house by house," reecting the expectation that civilians can be terrorized into
supporting the side most willing to hurt them.5 If bandwagoning is the dominant civilian
4Sean D. Naylor, \McChrystal: Civilian deaths endanger mission," Army Times, 30 May 2010.
5Kareem Fahim and David D. Kirkpatrick, \Qaddafi's Grip on the Capital Tightens as Revolt Grows,"
The New York Times, 22 February 2011.
2survival strategy, escalation is not necessarily inecient. Indeed, combatants will resort to
punishment precisely because it works.
The balancing-bandwagoning debate is far from settled: punishment often occurs in
practice, and civilians respond with both types of strategies. The empirical variety of rela-
tionships between killing and popular support has prompted the development of theoretical
models capable of accounting for both the deterrent and escalatory impacts of coercion
(Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998, 2000; Carey, 2006). Most such eorts have been grounded in
microeconomic producer theory, where actors seek an optimal allocation of resources between
violence and non-violence (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). Others have given more formal
consideration to the strategic interaction between incumbents and opponents (Crescenzi,
1999; Pierskala, 2010). Much recent theoretical work has focused on one-sided violence con-
ducted by an incumbent regime in peacetime (Lskavyan, 2007; Gregory et al., 2011) or by
the winning party to a civil war (Esteban et al., 2010), although less attention has been
devoted to the competitive dynamics of two-sided violence.
The literature has yielded a wealth of useful insights into the determinants of compro-
mise and violence, but important questions remain. First, under what conditions are civilians
better off selecting a balancing strategy, and under what conditions is bandwagoning prefer-
able? Few, if any, theoretical eorts have explicitly sought to accommodate both patterns
of cooperation in a unied model. Second, conditional on the strategy of civilians, what
is the optimal level of force each combatant should use? If, as the bandwagoning school
contends, civilians can maximize their chances of survival by supporting the greater of two
evils, the motivation behind punishment is straightforward: victory will go to whichever side
can terrorize civilians the most. If, however, civilians are always better off by balancing,
why should we ever observe the use of selective violence where the risk of collateral damage
is high? After all, victory should go to whichever side can terrorize civilians the least.
Using an epidemic model of popular support dynamics, this paper oers two potential
explanations for punishment: information problems and local asymmetries. In the first
instance, combatants are unsure of how civilians will react to mounting casualties { by bal-
ancing against the side responsible for the majority of deaths, or by bandwagoning with it.
To cope with this uncertainty, combatants alternate between low and high levels of force.
In the second instance, punishment is used to exploit or compensate for local disadvantages
in personnel, intelligence and recruitment.6 In places where initial conditions slightly favor
6This insight is broadly consistent with empirical findings from Valentino et al. (2004); Hultman (2007);
Wood (2009) and Kocher et al. (2011).
3one side, bandwagoning encourages the disadvantaged combatant to escalate. Where the
advantage is overwhelming, one-sided violence by the hegemon occurs regardless of civilian
strategy. Where conditions approach parity, incentives exist for violence on both sides.
The epidemic model lends itself ttingly to the study of civil conict. While destruc-
tiveness and contagion are obvious substantive motivations to use infectious disease as an
analogy for conict, there are perhaps even more compelling theoretical and methodological
reasons to move beyond the metaphor and formally adapt mathematical models of epidemics
to the agenda of conict research.7 First, the epidemic model places population dynamics
at the center of the analysis, enabling the derivation of predictions about the ow of public
support from one ghting side to another. Second, the model is inherently dynamic, oering
insights not only into which equilibrium is reached, but also the process by which each equi-
librium is reached. Third, the model oers a exible, \workhorse" foundation for the study
of war, capable of accommodating increasing layers of causal complexity.
Although traditional mathematical epidemiology takes behavioral choice to be exogenous,
this paper considers optimizing strategic behavior on the part of the players.8 I employ an
epidemic model of popular support dynamics as a payo function for a simple three-player
game, and derive the players' best response strategies under several informational assump-
tions, in areas of contested and complete control. I also develop an evolutionary agent-based
model to examine the adaptation of civilian and combatant strategies in repeated play. By
closing the gap between epidemic modeling and game theory, the following paper accounts
for some of the literature's more puzzling ndings and yields a number of novel predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin with a simple narrative of civil conict as
a struggle for popular support, and formalize its logic and mechanisms with a system of
ordinary dierential equations. I then derive the model's equilibria and discuss how their
stability is inuenced by rates of punishment and levels of territorial control. A simulation
follows, in which three sets of actors { civilians, insurgents and the government { interact
and select optimal strategies through an evolutionary process. The analytical and simulated
results are then compared against stylized historical facts from the post-WWII Soviet coun-
terinsurgency campaign in Western Ukraine, using new disaggregated data from the archives
of the NKVD. The paper concludes with several summary remarks.
7Previous uses of the epidemic analogy in security studies and conict research have included Siverson and
Starr (1991); Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008); Braithwaite (2010). Previous efforts to formally apply epidemic
modeling to the social sciences have included Epstein (1997); Epstein and Axtell (1996); Kolesin (1998, 2000,
2010); Zhukov (2012).
8Earlier works that have considered adaptive behavior in epidemiological modeling include Kremer (1996);
Epstein et al. (2008).
41 The Narrative
Imagine a hypothetical conict zone with three sets of actors: civilians, insurgents and the
government. Sovereignty is contested between the government and insurgents, and the two
combatants compete for the support of the civilian population. To the side able to secure it,
popular support will bring taxes, manpower, food, supplies and intelligence. The extraction
of these resources is essential to the military eort and, ultimately, to the establishment of a
viable sovereign state (Elton, 1975; Tilly, 1985). Crucially, civilian cooperation is necessary
for the identication of one's rivals and the production of direct, or selective, violence against
them (Kalyvas, 2006; Balcells, 2010, 2011).
Sitting on the fence, civilians are interested in security above all else (Kalyvas, 2008b,
406). In deciding whether to support insurgents or the government, civilians seek to max-
imize their own chances of survival { by choosing the side that can most credibly provide
protection (balancing), or by joining the side causing them the most harm (bandwagoning).9
The government and the insurgents want to entice civilians to cooperate with them and
punish those who side with their opponents, but have dierential opportunities to do so.
In irregular war, the combatants' agents and collaborators tend to hide among the civilian
population, creating an \identication problem" whose severity depends on the balance of
territorial control (Kalyvas 2006, 89-91; Kalyvas 2008b, 407). Where the public already
supports the insurgents, the active opposition becomes dicult for the government to iden-
tify. Wary of punishment by insurgents, locals are hesitant to provide intelligence. Because
security forces are unable to correctly distinguish the insurgents' base of support from the
peaceful population, civilians are arrested and disappeared along with combatants. Likewise,
where the public supports the state, insurgents have diculty exercising selective violence
against government supporters. State presence, monitoring and retaliatory capacity are too
pervasive for insurgents to identify defectors without error. In each case, violence remains
selective by intent, but its targets are selected inaccurately in practice (Kalyvas, 2006, 189).
In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the two combatants must decide on an optimal level
of force, while accounting for their inability to fully control how accurate their use of selec-
tive violence will be. Civilians { as the potential, if often unintentional, victims of selective
violence { must choose balancing or bandwagoning as an optimal survival strategy. If they
9The logic of cooperation applies primarily to non-ethnic civil wars, and ethnic conicts where members
of one group are given the opportunity to defect to the other side. Where this is not the case (e.g. wars of
extermination), this logic has limited traction and cooperation patterns resemble those in conventional war
(Kalyvas, 2008a).
5balance, they will cooperate at a higher rate with the side inicting the least harm against
civilians. If they bandwagon, they will cooperate at a higher rate with the side inicting
the most harm. This cycle of punishment and cooperation continues until an equilibrium is
reached, in which either one side fully asserts control, or some form of stalemate is achieved.
An emerging conventional wisdom, most famously articulated by Kalyvas (2006, 111-112),
is that both civilian cooperation and patterns of violence are endogenous to the balance of
territorial control.10 Because civilians are most likely to cooperate where it is safe for them to
do so, selective violence is expected primarily in areas where its perpetrator enjoys dominant,
but incomplete territorial control { where the combatant's presence is sucient to facilitate
civilian cooperation, but not so hegemonic as to completely cut off opponents' access to
the population. By contrast, where territorial control approaches parity and both sides are
present in equal force { and thus equally capable of punishing those who help their enemies
{ selective violence is expected to be rare (Kalyvas, 2006, 204). Here, combatants lack the
intelligence needed to avoid civilian deaths and abstain from violence to avoid encouraging
support for their opponents. Where one side exercises complete territorial control, selective
violence by the hegemon is unlikely because it is unnecessary, while the weaker side is iso-
lated from the population and can only use indiscriminate force (Kalyvas, 2006, 220).
In sum, violence in partially-controlled areas is expected to be common; in divided and
fully-controlled areas, it is off the equilibrium path. These predictions rest on the assump-
tion that rational civilians balance rather than bandwagon: \everything else being equal,
most people prefer to collaborate with the political actor that best guarantees their survival"
(Kalyvas, 2008b, 406). Where selective violence is so inaccurate as to appear indiscriminate,
it is avoided because it is counterproductive. As I show below, dropping this assumption
allows us to explain why several other patterns of violence often occur: why insurgents in
a position of weakness may terrorize civilians, why strong governments may freely repress
opponents, why violence between two equally-matched combatants may spiral out of control.
The following section formalizes this stylized narrative and addresses two central ques-
tions. First, under what conditions are civilians better off selecting a balancing strategy,
and under what conditions is bandwagoning preferable? Second, conditional on the strategy
of civilians, what is the optimal level of punishment each combatant should apply?
10For additional research on the endogeneity of selective and indiscriminate violence in this context, see
Mason and Krane (1989); Kalyvas (1999, 2004, 2008b); Goodwin (2001); Kalyvas and Kocher (2007); Kocher
et al. (2011); Balcells (2011).
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Figure 1: Game Tree. BL and BW represent civilian balancing and bandwagoning strate-
gies. L and H represent low and high levels of insurgent or government violence. j()
represents the payos associated with each strategy set for players j 2 fC;I;Gg.
2 The Dynamics of Popular Support
The conict zone is populated by three sets of actors: civilians (C), insurgent supporters
(I) and government supporters (G). These groups are assumed mutually exclusive and
exhaustive, such that C + I + G = N and C
N + I
N + G
N = 1, where N is the total size of
the population. The civilians' objective is to stay alive. The insurgents' and government's
objectives are to monopolize their respective levels of public support.
Each agent must select some strategy s to pursue her goals. Based on their assessment of
the likelihood of survival in each case, civilians choose between strategies of balancing and
bandwagoning, sC 2 fBL;BWg. Based on their assessment of expected public support in
each case, insurgents and the government choose between low and high levels of violence,
sI 2 fL;Hg;sG 2 fL;Hg. This choice set is shown graphically in Figure 1.
Payoffs for each actor are denoted by C();I() and G(), and depend on the strategy
chosen by each actor and a set of initial conditions, discussed at length below. Civilian
payoffs are represented by the disutility of being punished by the two combatants, which
includes the human and material costs directly or indirectly inicted by the insurgents' and
government's use of force. Ranging from  1 (highest costs) to 0 (no costs), these costs are
highest when both combatants play H, lowest if both play L, and intermediate if one plays
H and the other L. Insurgent and government payoffs are directly linked to the equilibrium
7balance of active support for the two combatants. These payoffs range from 0 (no support)
to 1 (complete support), with 1=2 representing an evenly split balance of support.
The decision problem for each actor is to choose a strategy that maximizes her payoffs,
conditional on the choices available to the other two actors. Section 1 offered a brief narrative
of how these strategies might generate varying levels of civilian casualties and public support.
Section 2.1 introduces an epidemic model of popular support dynamics to formally specify
the payoff function mapping the strategy space to these outcomes.
Table 1: Notation Table
Symbol Description Operationalization
Population parameters
Ct total neutral civilians at time t Ct 2 [0;1)
It total insurgent supporters at time t It 2 [0;1)
Gt total government supporters at time t Gt 2 [0;1)
Strategy choices
 civilian cooperation strategy (sC)  2 f0;1g, with 1=balance, 0=bandwagon
I insurgents' punishment strategy (sI) I 2 f0;1g, with 1=high, 0=low
G government's punishment strategy (sG) G 2 f0;1g, with 1=high, 0=low
Exogenous parameters
I insurgents' territorial control I = 1   G 2 [0;1], with 1=full, 0=none
G government's territorial control G = 1   I 2 [0;1], with 1=full, 0=none
k constant civilian immigration rate k 2 (0;1)
u constant population death rate u 2 (0;1)
Endogenous parameters
I rate of civilian cooperation with insurgents I = (1   G)G + (1   )(1   I)I
G rate of civilian cooperation with government G = (1   I)I + (1   )(1   G)G
Payoff functions
C() payoffs to civilians (costs of punishment) C() =  
 
(1   I)I + (1   G)G

I() payoffs to insurgents (equilibrium support) I() = Ieq=(Ieq + Geq)
G() payoffs to government (equilibrium support) G() = Geq=(Ieq + Geq)
2.1 The Model
The rate of change in public support is modeled as a function of punishment, territorial con-
trol and cooperation. These dynamics are shown graphically in Figure 2, where C represents
neutral civilians, I represents insurgent supporters, and G represents government supporters.
Table 1 summarizes the various parameters, their symbology and operationalization.
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a) Punishment. Insurgents and the government regulate the size of each other's groups
through punishment { a label that includes any form of selective violence that forcibly
removes combatants from the battleeld (Kalyvas, 2006, 173-74). The government
punishes insurgent supporters at rate G and the insurgents punish government sup-
porters at rate I (Figure 2a). For the government, this rate can be interpreted as the
number of arrests, executions, deportations (if selective), or constraints on escalation
imposed by military rules of engagement. For insurgents, this parameter can be in-
terpreted as the frequency of bombings, hit-and-run attacks, assaults, ambushes and
assassinations, as well as larger-scale oensive operations.
b) Territorial control. Selective violence is rarely as accurate as Figure 2a would sug-
gest. A combatant's ability to correctly identify her rivals depends on the quality of
her local intelligence, which in turn depends on the willingness of the local population
to denounce supporters of the other side. As noted by Kalyvas (2008b, 407), such
information is easier to obtain where the risk of retaliation, or counter-denunciation,
is relatively low.11 The quality of intelligence thus depends on the balance of terri-
torial control in the conict zone (I;G). Where territorial control is not absolute
11The logic here is consistent with Kalyvas's insight that \individuals want to denounce [supporters of
a rival faction] only where it is safe for them to do so. This is the case in areas of full control (where
political actors do not need their information) but not in areas of low control (where they are likely to face
retaliation)" (Kalyvas, 2008b, 407).
9(0 < I < 1 or 0 < G < 1), as in Figure 2b, the \identication problem" asserts itself:
some portion of overall punishment will befall combatants as intended (II;GG), but
the remainder will be erroneously inicted on civilians (I(1 I);G(1 G)). Where
combatant j exercises strong control (j ! 1), intelligence quality is relatively robust,
enabling her to target opponents with higher precision (jj ! j) and avoid civilian
casualties (j(1   j) ! 0). Where the combatant is weak (j ! 0), her intelligence is
poor and civilian deaths are harder to avoid (j(1   j) ! j).12
c) Cooperation. Civilians cooperate with insurgents at rate I, and with the govern-
ment at rate G (Figure 2c). The relative magnitude of these rates depends on the
strategy selected by civilians. If civilians choose to balance ( = 1), their coopera-
tion with side A will be increasing in the rate of civilian victimization by side B. If
they choose to bandwagon ( = 0), it will be increasing in the rate of victimization
by side A. The two strategies present opposite incentives for combatants: balancing
favors restraint, while bandwagoning favors escalation. If insurgents punish civilians
at a low rate and the government punishes at a high rate, balancing civilians will be
more inclined to cooperate with insurgents and bandwagoning civilians will be more
inclined to cooperate with the government. Formally,
I = (1   G)G + (1   )(1   I)I (1)
G = (1   I)I + (1   )(1   G)G
As Figure 2c indicates, the overall scale of cooperation is proportional to the frequency
of contacts between civilians and current active supporters (II, GG). This propor-
tionality assumes that physical contact between civilians and combatants is necessary
for recruitment. It is not sucient for an individual to unilaterally declare herself to be
an active supporter, or for a combatant to simply add a civilian's name to some roster.
This denition excludes the \lone wolf" phenomenon, and assumes that combatants'
ability to recruit personnel is endogenous to existing levels of active support.
d) Immigration and Death. In the absence of punishment, the civilian population is
regulated by a simple immigration-death process. Civilians migrate into the conict
zone at rate k and are removed at a natural death rate u, which may be interpreted as
losses due to disease, malnutrition, natural disasters, age and other exogenous factors
12For simplicity, I assume that territorial control is zero-sum (I = 1 G and G = 1 I), such that one
side can improve her intelligence assets only at the expense of the other. Consequently, as the use of force
by one side becomes more accurate, use of force by the other side becomes more inaccurate.
10that afflict civilians and combatants equally.13 The parameter k may be set as a
constant rate, or a variable rate that balances exactly the death rates of all players
kt =
 
(1   I)I + (1   G)G + u

Ct + (II + u)Gt + (GG + u)It.
Taken together, the dynamic process can be represented as a system of ordinary differential
equations, in which the rate of change in popular support is a function of cooperation,
punishment and territorial control:
dC
dt
= k   (IIt + GGt + I(1   I) + G(1   G) + u)Ct (2)
dI
dt
= (ICt   GG   u)It (3)
dG
dt
= (GCt   II   u)Gt (4)
with I;G as defined in (1). Without loss of generality, let us assume that strategic choices
are binary, such that j = 1 when combatant j plays H (high punishment) and j = 0 when
she plays L (low). Similarly, let  = 1 when civilians play BL (balancing) and  = 0 when
they play BW (bandwagoning).
Apart from the territorial control parameter and the endogenization of cooperation, the
system in (2-4) resembles a traditional epidemiological model of infection biology, in which
two parasite strains compete for the same host (Nowak and May, 1994, 2000; Nowak, 2006).
3 Civil War Outcomes
The outcome of the dynamic process in (2-4) depends on the relative size of the basic re-
productive ratio for each combatant, dened as the number of new active supporters caused
by the introduction of a single combatant into a population of neutral civilians. The basic
reproductive ratios for insurgents and the government, respectively, are given by
RI =
I
GG + u

k
G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u
(5)
RG =
G
II + u

k
G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u
(6)
with I;G as defined in (1). The first part of expression (5) represents the average number
of new supporters recruited by an insurgent agent in her lifetime { the rate at which neutral
13The immigration-death process is frequently used in epidemiological models as a simple, though artificial,
way to obtain a stable population (Nowak and May, 1994; May and Nowak, 1995).
11civilians cooperate with a single insurgent (I), scaled by the average lifetime of an insurgent
supporter ((GG +u) 1). The second part represents the equilibrium abundance of neutral
civilians { the rate of civilian immigration (k), scaled by the average lifetime of civilians
((G(1 G)+I(1 I)+u) 1). The interpretation is the same for the government in (6).
The basic reproductive ratio represents a critical threshold in epidemiology. If RI <
1, fewer than one civilian will cooperate with each insurgent supporter and the insurgent
population will converge to zero over time. If RI > 1, the insurgent population will rise
exponentially, peak and converge to a stable positive equilibrium. If RI < 1 and RG < 1,
both combatant populations will dwindle and the system will converge to an equilibrium
where everyone is a neutral civilian:
Eq. 0: Ceq =
k
G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u
Ieq = 0 Geq = 0 (7)
If RI > 1;RG > 1 or both, one of three outcomes becomes possible: insurgent victory,
government victory, or stalemate.
3.1 Conditions for insurgent victory
An insurgent victory is defined as an outcome where insurgents monopolize popular support
and no government agents remain in the population, implying Ieq > 0;Geq = 0, and I() =
1;G() = 0 as operationalized in Table 1. This equilibrium is represented by
Eq. 1: (8)
Ceq =
II + u
I
Ieq =
kI  
 
G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u

(GG + u)
I(GG + u)
Geq = 0
which is stable if and only if RI > RG (see proof in appendix).
What strategy profiles are likely to produce this outcome? Where territorial control is
evenly divided between the two combatants (I = G = 1=2), RI > RG is true under the
strategy profiles (sC = BL;sI = L;sG = H) and (sC = BW;sI = H;sG = L). In the
fist instance, an insurgent victory occurs when civilians balance against the more aggressive
government. In the second, civilians bandwagon with the more aggressive insurgents. In
each case, victory results from an asymmetric use of punishment (I > G;G > I).
An insurgent victory is also possible under symmetric punishment (G = I > 0), if one
of the two sides enjoys an initial intelligence advantage. When insurgents have an advantage
12in territorial control (I > 1=2), RI > RG is true under (sC = BL;sI = H;sG = H). When
the government has an advantage (G > 1=2), RI > RG is true under (sC = BW;sI =
H;sG = H). In the first instance, insurgents are able to more accurately identify and target
government supporters, causing fewer civilian casualties than their enemy despite an equal
rate of punishment. Victory occurs because balancing civilians ock to the side able that
avoids collateral damage. In the second instance, insurgents are responsible for a greater
share of civilian casualties, but win because bandwagoning civilians support the side most
willing to hurt them.
3.2 Conditions for government victory
A government victory occurs when no insurgents remain in the population and the govern-
ment monopolizes popular support (Ieq = 0;Geq > 0, and I() = 0;G() = 1).
Eq. 2: (9)
Ceq =
GG + u
G
Ieq = 0 Geq =
kG   (II + u)(G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u)
G(II + u)
This equilibrium is stable if and only if RI < RG (see proof in appendix).
Assuming parity of territorial control (I = G = 1=2), RI < RG holds under the strategy
proles (sC = BL;sI = H;sG = L) and (sC = BW;sI = L;sG = H). In the fist instance,
government victory occurs when civilians balance and the insurgents employ a higher rate of
punishment. In the second, civilians bandwagon and the government uses more punishment
than insurgents.
As before, local asymmetries produce two additional possibilities: (sC = BW;sI =
H;sG = H) if insurgents have an advantage in territorial control (I > 1=2), and (sC =
BL;sI = H;sG = H) if the government has the advantage (G > 1=2). In the first case,
the government wins because civilians bandwagon with the more inaccurate side, and in the
second civilians balance against it.
3.3 Conditions for stalemate
A stalemate occurs when popular support is evenly split between insurgents and the govern-
ment at equilibrium (Ieq = Geq, and I() = G() = 1=2). When dI=dt = 0 and I > 0, the
equilibrium value of C is (II + u)=I. When dG=dt = 0 and G > 0, the equilibrium value
of C is (GG + u)=G. When both of these conditions are true simultaneously, we obtain
13the following equilibrium:
Eq. 3: Ceq =
II + u
I
=
GG + u
G
(10)
Ieq =
kI   (GG + u)(G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u)
I(GG + u)
Geq =
kG   (II + u)(G(1   G) + I(1   I) + u)
G(II + u)
Ieq = Geq
which is stable if and only if RI = RG.
Unlike the equilibria in (8-9), the stalemate outcome does not depend on civilian strategy
and is completely determined by punishment choices and territorial control. At any level of
incomplete control (0 < I < 1), RI = RG if neither side punishes (sC = BL or BW;sI =
L;sG = L). In areas of perfectly contested control (I = G = 1=2), RI = RG if the rate of
punishment is positive but symmetric (sC = BL or BW;sI = H;sG = H). When insurgents
enjoy complete control (I = 1), enabling them to fully avoid civilian casualties, RI = RG
if (sC = BL or BW;sI = H;sG = L). Conversely, when the government enjoys complete
control (G = 1), RI = RG if (sC = BL or BW;sI = L;sG = H). In this sense, complete
territorial control enables the hegemon to unilaterally punish without losing support, as long
as the enemy doesn't escalate. Under such circumstances, the civilian population is unaf-
fected by the violent interaction between combatants. It suers no costs by way of collateral
damage and remains indierent as to which side it should support to maximize its security.
Figure 3 summarizes the game's payos under each strategy prole (sC;sI;sG), and under
three distributions of territorial control: (a) divided control, G = 1=2, (b) incomplete gov-
ernment control, 1=2 < G < 1, and (c) complete government control, G = 1.14 For civilians,
the disutility associated with each strategy prole is increasing in the rate of punishment
employed by the two sides, C(sC;sI;sG) =  
 
I(1   I) + G(1   G)

. Punishment is
most costly if both combatants play H, least costly if both play L and intermediate if only
one plays H. For combatants, payos are increasing in the equilibrium share of support,
I(sC;sI;sG) =
Ieq
Ieq+Geq and G(sC;sI;sG) =
Geq
Ieq+Geq, with Ieq;Geq as dened in (7-10).15
14Parameter values:  = f1 if sC = BL, 0 if sC = BWg; I = f1 if sI = H, 0 if sI = Lg; G = f1 if
sG = H, 0 if sG = Lg; kt =
 
u + (1   I)I + (1   G)G

Ct + (u + II)Gt + (u + GG)It;u = 1.
15Insurgent and government victories (I = 1;G = 0 and I = 0;G = 1) occur under Eq. 1 and 2. A
stalemate (I = G = 1=2) occurs under Eq. 0 or Eq. 3.
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Figure 3: Payoffs: (a) parity of territorial control, G = 1=2, (b) incomplete government
control, 1=2 < G < 1, (c) complete government control, G = 1 . Numbers in parentheses
represent payoffs in the order (C;I;G).
The game tree shows how civilian strategy shapes incentives for punishment. If civilians
balance, whichever side can minimize its share of civilian casualties will win the game. Un-
der bandwagoning, whichever side can terrorize civilians the most will win the game. Yet if
combatant victory, defeat and stalemate can occur under either of the two civilian strate-
gies, two questions arise. First, is it ever preferable for civilians to bandwagon rather than
balance? Second, if { as one might expect { civilians prefer a strategy that rewards restraint,
why would we ever observe high rates of punishment in equilibrium?
4 When Does Punishment Occur?
The following section explores the equilibria in (8-10) as outcomes of a strategic interaction
between civilians and combatants. It is shown that the strategy profile sC = BL;sI =
L;sG = L represents a subgame perfect equilibrium. Under perfect information, civilians'
best response survival strategy is to balance, while combatants are both best off using a
low level of punishment. This equilibrium, however, can become unstable if insurgent and
government supporters are not aware of the civilians' strategy choice. Under imperfect
information, the (BL;L;L) equilibrium breaks down and high rates of punishment occur.
This punishment is likely to be two-sided where territorial control is evenly split, and one-
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Figure 4: Informational Assumptions. Dotted lines represent information sets available
to each player. If a dotted line connects two or more decision nodes, the corresponding
player is aware that the preceding player has moved, but does not know which node within
the information set has been reached as a result of that player's move.
sided where the balance of control favors one of the two combatants.
We now examine best response strategies under four sets of informational assumptions:
A. Complete and perfect information. Civilians choose to balance or bandwagon, while in-
surgent and government supporters choose optimal levels of force. The preferences and
choices of each player are visible to all other players (Figure 4a).
B. Combatant choices unknown. Civilians' choice is observed by the insurgents and the
government, but neither combatant can observe what the other does (Figure 4b).
C. Civilian choice unknown. Combatants observe each other's moves, but not the civilians'
choice to balance or bandwagon (Figure 4c).
D. All choices unknown. Civilians, insurgents and the government do not observe any of the
choices taken by other players (Figure 4d).
4.1 Divided territorial control
We begin with the case where neither side enjoys an advantage in territorial control (G =
1=2). Here, when each actor is given perfect information about the decisions of previous
players (condition A), the strategy prole (BL;L;L) constitutes a subgame perfect equi-
librium. The civilians have the upper hand: knowing that insurgents are likely to play L
16if civilians balance and H if they bandwagon, civilians will prefer the former equilibrium
because it minimizes the costs of being punished. Knowing that civilians have selected a
balancing strategy, L is unconditionally best-performing in the resulting subgame. Insur-
gents understand that if they opt for a low level of violence, the government will do the
same, and if they opt for a high killing rate, the government will choose restraint. Since
insurgent payos are maximized when the combatants play LL rather than HL, insurgents
will choose the former, resulting in the prole (BL;L;L). No single player or coalition of
players can accomplish a Pareto-improvement by deviating from this equilibrium.
The same result holds when the players are given more limited information about each
other's choices (condition B). Here, civilians' choices are observed, but the two combatants'
moves are not. Even so, the dominant strategy prole remains sC = BL; sI = L; sG = L. In
a balancing scenario, each combatant will be better off playing L irrespective of the other's
choice. In a bandwagoning scenario, each will be better off playing H. Civilians anticipate
that some Nash equilibrium will be played in each of the subgames in the second stage.
Because they prefer an LL outcome to HH, civilians will choose to balance.
The uniqueness of the (BL;L;L) equilibrium falls apart when combatants are not given
information about the civilians' choices (condition C). Here, insurgents' moves are observed
by the government, but neither combatant is aware of which subgame they are playing {
balancing or bandwagoning. The solution becomes a mixed strategy equilibrium in which
one of four outcomes is possible: (BL;L;L), (BL;H;H), (BW;L;L) and (BW;H;H), where
(BL;L;L) Pareto-dominates the others. Insurgents understand that if they play L or H, the
government will look at the potential outcomes in both subgames and will play whichever
strategy maximizes her minimum payo. The minimum government payo possible under
an LL prole is 1/2, compared to 0 under LH; the minimum payo under an HL scenario
is 0, compared to 1/2 under HH. As a result, insurgents expect the government to match
their rates of killing. Insurgents further understand that { while their payos are identical
under LL and HH { the stability of each equilibrium depends on the civilian's choice. In-
stead of choosing one of the two pure strategies, insurgents will choose some lottery among
them, knowing that the government, as the nal mover, will simply copy this choice. Civil-
ians, unsure of whether the combatants will play LL or HH, will choose whichever strategy
maximizes their lowest potential payos from the two scenarios. Under both balancing and
bandwagoning, however, this minimum payo is -1. To cope with this indierence and the
uncertainty surrounding the insurgents' decisions, civilians will seek to optimize their chances
of survival by randomizing their use of balancing and bandwagoning. This result is equiva-
17(a) Divided control (G = 1=2) (b) Incomplete control (G > 1=2) (c) Complete control (G = 1)
Figure 5: Mixed strategy equilibria. Red areas represent the intersection of players' best
response mappings.
lent to what would obtain if the order of moves were to be reversed, with civilians moving
last.
This example illustrates that punishment can emerge when combatants are not aware of
civilians' choices. Although the equilibria (BL;L;L) and (BW;H;H) do not present any
opportunities for protable unilateral or coalition deviations, the two other equilibria are
inherently unstable. In a (BL;H;H) equilibrium, both combatants have an incentive to
unilaterally switch to an L strategy. In a (BW;L;L) equilibrium, both would be better off
unilaterally switching to H. Unless combatants can obtain information on civilian decision-
making as they did in sets A and B, large-scale punishment can be dicult to prevent.16
Restraint becomes even more dicult to sustain when no player has information on
the choices of any other (condition D), and strategic decisions are either unknown or unob-
servable. Let (s) be the joint probability associated with strategy prole s = (sC;sI;sG)
when civilians, insurgents and the government play mixed strategies. Let Pr(sjj j) be
16A natural objection to this result is that real-life actors do not play mixed strategies. Civilians and
insurgents are unlikely to leave their fate to a coin toss, and will rely instead on their prior beliefs about
each others' behavior. While such objections are perfectly valid and justified, I assumed at priors for two
reasons. First, there is no shortage of potential mechanisms for the formation of actors' beliefs { \focal
points" (Schelling 1960), fear, salience (Sandler and Sargent 1995) and Bayesian updating are four among
many (Medina 2010, 44-51). Informative priors must come from somewhere, and this origin must be specified
and defended against its alternatives. This type of exercise, while useful, is ultimately outside the scope
of the current paper. Second, as with any model being introduced for the first time, core predictions are
most easily presented and interpreted without potentially confounding assumptions about players' culture,
institutions, history and traditions.
18the probability that player j chooses strategy sj, conditional of the mixed strategies of
all other players. The full set of mixed strategy equilibria is shown graphically in Fig-
ure 5a, as an intersection of players' best response mappings (Ungureanu and Botnari,
2005). When Pr(sC = BLj C) > :5, the combatants will play LL with probability 1.
When Pr(sC = BLj C) < :5, the combatants will play HH with probability 1. When
Pr(sC = BLj C) = :5, the combatants will choose some lottery of L and H. Asymmetric
violence (LH or HL) occurs in equilibrium only if civilians are equally likely to balance
or bandwagon. In every other case, we should expect to see two-sided restraint (LL) or
two-sided punishment (HH).
4.2 Incomplete government control
The results shown thus far assume that neither combatant benets from an advantage in
territorial control, and the ability to collect intelligence and correctly distinguish one's oppo-
nents from civilians is identical for the two sides (I = G = 1=2). What sorts of interactions
might we expect where the balanced of power is more uneven? Because the combatants'
subgame is symmetric, I focus here on the case of incomplete government control, with the
understanding that results generalize to insurgent advantage as well.
A higher level of government control yields an intelligence advantage, reducing the insur-
gents' ability to accurately identify opponents (I < 1=2) and increasing the government's
ability to identify insurgent collaborators (G > 1=2). Even if they exactly matched the
government's level of violence (HH), insurgents would still be responsible for a higher share
of civilian casualties, and government forces could successfully eliminate a greater share of
insurgent supporters. Because civilian costs from insurgent punishment are relatively high,
balancing civilians will cooperate with the government. Bandwagoning civilians will coop-
erate with insurgents.
Returning to the four sets of informational constraints discussed above, intelligence asym-
metry does not change the outcome of the game so long as civilian choice is known (conditions
A and B). In the balancing subgame, LL is the Nash equilibrium. The bandwagoning sub-
game has two equilibria: HL and HH. Civilian costs are lowest under LL, leading to the
unique equilibrium (BL;L;L).
When civilian choice is unknown (conditions C and D), additional outcomes become pos-
sible. Unlike in the case of intelligence parity, insurgents cannot expect the government to
copy their punishment strategy. The minimum government payo possible under an LL
prole is 1=2, which is preferred to a minimum of 0 under LH. However, the government's
19minimum payo { like that of the insurgents { is 0 under both HL and HH. Insurgents
understand that the government is likely to respond to L by playing L, and to H by playing
some lottery of L and H. Risk-averse insurgents will prefer a worst-case scenario of stalemate
to a worst-case scenario of defeat, leading to a combatant strategy prole of LL. While civil-
ian payos from (BL;L;L) and (BW;L;L) are identical, the (BW;L;L) equilibrium is far
more unstable { both insurgents and the government can obtain a Pareto improvement by
unilaterally escalating punishment. Indeed, insurgents can secure victory through escalation
irrespective of whether the government also deviates from L.
The resulting set of mixed strategy equilibria (Figure 5b) is more expansive than that
under parity (Figure 5a), though potentially less costly to civilians. As before, combatants
will both play L if the probability of balancing is better than even (Pr(SC = BLj C) > :5)
and some lottery of L and H if Pr(SC = BLj C) = :5. If civilians are more likely to
bandwagon (Pr(SC = BLj C) < :5), mutual punishment (HH) is no longer assured. If
civilians bandwagon with the side that inicts the most costs, then the insurgents { if only
by virtue of their local disadvantage { are always better off escalating. The government,
meanwhile, is indierent to the payos under (BW;H;L) and (BW;H;H), since they lose
support in either case. As long as Pr(SG = Hj I) < 1, however, expected costs to civilians
under bandwagoning (Pr(SC = BLj C) < :5) are lower in areas of incomplete control than
in areas of parity: an equilibrium in which only one side always punishes is less costly than
one in which both combatants always punish. In this limited sense, bandwagoning civilians
living in areas of partial control are better off than those in areas of divided control.
Initial advantages in territorial control, as these results show, do not translate easily into
victory for the side that possesses them. Such an outcome can only occur if civilians balance
and both sides punish at the same rate { a strategy prole that cannot be maintained in
equilibrium. Oddly enough, the disadvantaged side can benet more from its weakness than
the advantaged side can from its strength. As Figure 5b shows, bandwagoning encourages
unconditional punishment by the weaker side. To terrorize the population into lending its
support, the disadvantaged insurgents need only to match or exceed the government's level
of violence.
4.3 Complete government control
Do these results generalize to non-contested areas, where one of the combatants exercises a
monopoly on territorial control? Under complete control (G = 1), the government is able
to perfectly monitor the population and correctly identify insurgent supporters. Because
20the identity of insurgents is public knowledge, the government is unrestrained in the level of
violence it can use against them. The number of civilian casualties is zero under L and H,
enabling the government to unleash a wave of arrests or executions without fear of alienating
a balancing civilian population. Because payos are unaected by the government's use of
force, the initiative now lies with insurgents, who have no access to the population and can
only use highly inaccurate forms of violence to obtain coercive leverage.
When civilian choice is known (conditions A and B), two outcomes are possible: (BL;L;L)
and (BL;L;H). In the balancing subgame, L is the insurgents' unconditionally best-
performing strategy, but the government is indierent between L and H. In the band-
wagoning subgame, insurgents are always best off playing H, but the government is again
indierent. Civilians expect costs of 0 under BL and  1 under BW, and choose the former.
When civilian choice is unknown (conditions C and D), the game has four potential
outcomes { (BL;L;L), (BL;L;H), (BW;H;L) and (BW;H;H) { and a broad space of
mixed strategy equilibria (Figure 5c). If the probability of balancing is better than even
(Pr(SC = BLj C) > :5), insurgents always play L and the government plays a lottery of
L and H. If Pr(SC = BLj C) < :5, the insurgents play H and the government plays L or
H. If Pr(SC = BLj C) = :5, both combatants play some lottery of L and H.
While local asymmetries in territorial control add a layer of complexity to the players'
strategic calculus, they do not fundamentally alter the logic of the game: combatants are
likely to play L when civilians balance and H when civilians bandwagon. The key distinc-
tion is whether the resulting violence is unilateral or two-sided. Under incomplete control,
civilian balancing deters punishment by both sides and bandwagoning encourages escalation,
especially for the weaker side. Under complete control, bandwagoning has the same eect,
but balancing deters only the weaker combatant: as long as the government's use of violence
is perfectly selective, inicting no costs on neutral civilians, the hegemon neither loses nor
gains support by cracking down on her opponents.
5 The evolution of punishment
The solutions examined above assume that the three players act in a unitary fashion, are
aware of the payos associated with each strategy prole, and will select whichever strategy
optimizes these payos given the choices available to other players. In practice, however,
strategy choice is often a matter of trial and error: based on a prior history of strategic in-
teractions, players will adopt well-performing strategies and abandon poor-performing ones.
21Over time, this learning process should converge to a steady state, where dominated strate-
gies will have mostly disappeared from the players' repertoire. In place of a Nash Equilibrium
from classical game theory, such evolutionary games turn on the diusion of best practices.17
To examine the likelihood of punishment in an evolutionary context, I develop an agent-
based model in which 50 actors of each type are randomly grouped in sets of three (C;I;G),
and play the game as described in condition D in Section 4.1. The initial strategy for each
of the 150 players is decided by a fair coin toss (BL or BW for the civilians, L or H for the
combatants). For each of t generations, the randomly grouped agents play the game against
each other for 100 rounds, and receive payos C;I;G associated with the triad's strategy
prole. The players then evaluate their strategies: the player with the lowest payo in each
of the groups C;I;G abandons her strategy and adopts the strategy of the best-performing
player of her type.18 Of the players who switch strategies, some proportion p choose a ran-
dom \mutant" strategy instead of the incumbent, best-performing one. The players are then
randomly re-grouped into new triads. This cycle is repeated for 10,000 generations, over the
course of which successful strategies increase in frequency at the expense of the less success-
ful. Unless \mutant" strategies outperform incumbent ones, the population should converge
to an evolutionarily stable state, where the proportion of agents playing pure strategy sj can
be interpreted as a mixed strategy equilibrium.19
Figure 6 shows the population's evolution over 10,000 generations under three scenarios:
(a) divided territorial control, (b) incomplete government control, and (c) complete govern-
ment control. In each case, the mutation parameter is set at p = :05. The horizontal axis
displays the generation number, while the color ramp indicates the proportion of agents in
each group (C;I;G) playing each of the pure strategies. Solid blue lines indicate that 100%
of the civilian population is using a balancing strategy, while solid red indicates that 100% is
bandwagoning. Purple lines indicate a mixed, or polymorphic population. For combatants,
green lines indicate that 100% of the actors are using a low level of force, and black lines
indicate that 100% are using a high level of force. At the outset of the simulation, each
group is split evenly between balancers and bandwagoneers, or high and low punishers.
The results of the agent-based model show that a peaceful equilibrium can be dicult
to maintain due to the ckleness of civilians. In the divided control scenario (Figure 6a), the
17See Maynard Smith (1982); Gintis (2009).
18In the case of ties, the worst- and best-performing players are be selected at random, proportional to
their payoffs.
19Much like a Nash Equilibrium presupposes that no player can benet for unilateral deviation, an Evo-
lutionarily Stable Population State (ESPS) presupposes that a population cannot be \invaded" by players
with mutant strategies.
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Figure 6: Evolutionary agent-based model. Horizontal axis represents time (in genera-
tions), color shades represent proportion of population playing each pure strategy.
23combatants' subgame converges to the state (L;L) after fewer than 100 generations, while
over half of the civilian population plays BL. This state is akin to the upper-right hand
corner of the mixed strategy equilibrium space in Figure 5a { if the probability of balancing
is greater than even, both combatants will choose a low rate of punishment. Civilians, how-
ever, prove highly vulnerable to perturbations from mutation and have diculty coalescing
around a single strategy. As shown before in Figure 3, civilian payos are identical under
the outcomes (BL;L;L) and (BW;L;L). As a result, civilians playing BW perform about
as well as those playing BL on average, provided that the combatants do not escalate. Due
to this indierence, balancing and bandwagoning strategies coexist in the population. If
the share of bandwagoning civilians becomes suciently high { as it does here after about
2500 generations { combatants begin to realize the benets of deviation from L. As mu-
tant combatants playing H have more chances to interact with bandwagoning civilians, they
outperform combatants playing the incumbent L strategy. By generation 3000, other com-
batants catch on to the benets of escalation, and the system shifts from the low-violence
state (BL;L;L) to the mass killing state (BW;H;H). After this happens, civilians gradu-
ally begin to re-adopt a balancing strategy to maximize their survival. The HH equilibrium,
however, can endure for thousands of generations before peace is restored. Rather than set-
tling into a single enduring state, the dynamics of the system are characterized by multiple
equilibria: periods of fragile peace interrupted by long spells of two-sided violence.
Similar dynamics are seen in the case of incomplete government control (Figure 6b), but
the distribution of violence is more one-sided. The combatants begin by adopting an LL pro-
le while a majority of civilians plays BL. As the share of civilians playing BW increases,
mutant strategies of H begin to outperform the incumbent L. As we would expect from
the mixed strategy equilibria in Figure 5b, the proliferation of H strategies is noticeably
greater among the disadvantaged side. In the violent spells that begin at approximately the
2200th and 7200th generations, nearly all insurgents adopt a high rate of violence, while
only between a quarter and half of government agents do the same. When the balance of
territorial control partially favors one side, the state of the system alternates between periods
of peace and mostly one-sided violence, perpetrated by the weaker combatant. Because it is
no longer two-sided, violence in this region is noticeably less costly to civilians than in areas
of divided control: average civilian payos during the first 10,000 generations were -0.244
when G = 3=4, compared to -0.458 when G = 1=2.
In the case of complete government control (Figure 6c), insurgents again take advantage
of civilian drifts into bandwagoning. The government, however, is able to follow a wholly in-
24dependent strategic path. Regardless of civilian strategy, government agents who play H do
no better and no worse than those who play L, and the evolutionary process does not result
in strategic convergence. While the insurgent population is relatively homogenous in play-
ing L unless a suciently high number of civilians bandwagon, highly-violent government
agents continuously coexist with peaceful ones. Because the government's use of punishment
is highly accurate, however, civilians suer the least in areas of complete control: average
civilian payos were -0.099 when G = 1, less than half of what they were under incomplete
control. Although these costs could be completely avoided if civilians never bandwagoned
{ as would obtain under perfect information { the consolidation of sovereignty does make
bandwagoning less risky, protecting civilians from their own worst instincts.
6 Illustrative example: Soviet counterinsurgency
Are the model's main predictions consistent with the empirical record? The Soviet cam-
paign against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) oers a tting opportunity to compare the model's analyt-
ical and computational results against stylized historical facts. The nationalist insurgency
{ which primarily gripped the eight western regions (oblasts) of Ukraine during the late
stages of World War II and the subsequent period of post-war reconstruction (1943-50) {
was the longest and most destructive domestic conict encountered by the Soviet Union
since its founding in 1922.20 Over its course, both the insurgents and the Soviet People's
Commissariat for Internal Aairs (NKVD) placed a strategic emphasis on the punishment of
suspected enemy collaborators.21 As the balance of territorial control shifted from parity to
partial and then near-complete Soviet control, opportunities and motivations for punishment
changed in telling ways.
The following analysis relies on event data assembled from declassied incident reports,
war diaries, detainee interrogation transcripts and after-action reports from the Main Direc-
torate of the NKVD.22 These internal-use documents oer a rare glimpse at the real-time
20The conict region includes Chernovitskaya, Drogobychskaya, Lvovskaya, Rovenskaya, Stanislavskaya,
Tarnopol'skaya, Volynskaya and (after 1946) Zakarpatskaya oblasts.
21While the OUN was a Ukrainian nationalist organization, the chosen case does not violate the model's
assumptions about cooperation: with the notable exception of Poles { who had been largely removed from the
region through earlier campaigns of ethnic cleansing { local civilians generally had the option of cooperating
with either combatant. Indeed, the ranks of the OUN included a significant number of Red Army deserters
and ex-POWs from other parts of the USSR (Vladimirtsev and Kokurin, 2008, 425).
22Key archival data sources include GARF R-9401, Op. 1-2; GARF, F. R-9478, Op. 1; GARF, F. R-9479,
Op. 1; RGVA, F. 38650, Op. 1; TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 23
25Index
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
p
l
a
y
i
n
g
 
H
UPA (I)
NKVD (G)
H
L
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
Divided control Incomplete NKVD control Consolidated NKVD control
1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
NKVD
UPA
Figure 7: Time series, Combatant strategy choices in West Ukraine, 1943-1950.
information available to Soviet and insurgent commanders over the course of the conict.
The subset used here includes 7,132 conict events between 1943 and 1950 that meet Kaly-
vas (2006)'s denition of selective violence,23 each with micro-level information on locations,
dates, casualties and tactics. For the following analysis, these events were aggregated to
time-series cross-sectional data at the level of a district (rayon)-month.24
The dynamics of violence are shown in Figure 7, where the x-axis represents time and the
y-axis is the proportion of rayons where either the insurgents (UPA, solid line) or the govern-
ment (NKVD, dotted line) employed a high rate of punishment, dened as the incidence of
at least one episode of selective violence per month. The points represent unltered monthly
observations (proportion of districts where each combatant plays H) and the smoothed lines
represent the trend component of the time series, extracted with loess regression as part of
a seasonal-trend decomposition (Cleveland et al., 1990). Below the line plot is an alternate
view of the time trend, with the same symbology as in Figure 6. Light green shades indicate
that combatants in most rayons play L and darker shades indicate that they play H.
The Ukrainian case can be separated into three phases: (1) a period of parity between the
23Events were coded using an actor-action-target framework. For an event of selective insurgent violence,
actors included OUN-SB (security service) and UPA; tactics included reghts, encirclements, assassina-
tions, raids, ambushes, defensive battles, kidnappings, and acts of terrorism; targets included security forces,
party activists and civilians. For selective government violence, actors included the internal troops of the
NKVD/MGB/MVD, Soviet partisans, and paramilitaries (\destruction battalions"); tactics included re-
ghts, encirclements, assassinations, raids, ambushes, weapons seizures, defensive battles and deportations;
targets included suspected insurgents, their families and civilians. This denition excludes incidents of in-
discriminate violence, which do not require the provision of information by civilians (e.g. cordon-and-search
operations, search-and-destroy missions, artillery and air strikes, large-scale positional or maneuver warfare).
24Each cross-section is based on a universal sample of 225 rayons from the eight West Ukrainian oblasts
(Presidium of Supreme Soviet of USSR, Information-Statistical Division, 1946).
26OUN and Soviet partisans in 1943, (2) a period of dominant, but incomplete Soviet control
in 1944-1947, and (3) a period of consolidated Soviet control in 1948-1950. The epidemic
model predicts symmetric levels of selective violence under divided control, and asymmetric
levels of violence under incomplete and total control, with the disadvantaged side more likely
to escalate in the first case and the dominant side more likely to escalate in the second. The
dynamics of the Ukrainian conict are largely consistent with these expectations.
The most common strategy prole during the period of divided control in 1943 was
(sC = BL;sI = L;sG = L). Although pre-war Soviet institutions were never robust in
the borderland regions of Western Ukraine { which were annexed from Poland after the
Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 { the local party apparatus was completely dismantled under Ger-
man occupation. The main local agents of the government during this period were Soviet
partisans, who launched their first raids in the region during the autumn of 1942. The
OUN, which sought to establish an independent Ukrainian state, saw the partisans as a
more dangerous rival than the German security forces, particularly as the local population
grew increasingly hostile to the Nazis and were eager to support any force that would mili-
tarily challenge them (Statiev, 2008). In response to partisan raids, nationalist forces loyal
to Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) organized their own armed militia (UPA) in late 1942, and
focused the bulk of their subsequent military activity against Soviet agents.
As the prospect of German defeat became more apparent in 1943, the local population
gradually became polarized between pro- and anti-Soviet elements (Statiev, 2010, 78-79).
Although nationalist guerillas were initially more numerous than the partisans, they were
not as well organized and faced a public relations problem due to perceptions of collaboration
with the Germans. The UPA was indeed eective at frustrating partisan operations against
the Wehrmacht, but also faced a war on multiple fronts against internal political enemies,
ethnic Poles, Soviet collaborators and { for six months in 1943, largely in response to public
pressure { against occupying German authorities (Statiev, 2008). Given the population's
response to repressive German occupation policies (Dallin, 1981), an expectation of civilian
balancing prevailed. Not until the Red Army's reoccupation of the borderlands in February-
August 1944 did the insurgents turn their full attention to the large-scale punishment of
suspected Soviet supporters.
The dominant strategy prole under incomplete Soviet control in 1944-1947 was (BW;H;L).
As the Soviets reasserted their presence in the borderlands, establishing local party coun-
cils (sel'sovety) and drafting military-age men into the Red Army, the government at first
abstained from the use of selective violence and sought to fight the UPA with conventional
27means like positional battles, search-and-destroy missions and cordon-and-search operations
(Vladimirtsev and Kokurin, 2008, 136). This approach { which did not rely on intelligence
from local civilians { brought signicant early successes, decimating the larger formations
of the UPA.25 Suering catastrophic losses and large-scale defections to the Soviets, the
OUN-B re-organized the UPA into small, mobile units suitable for guerilla warfare and be-
gan a campaign of terror and intimidation against suspected Soviet agents. Groups selected
for insurgent punishment included \Komsomol members, Red Army ocers, policemen, [...]
those who evade service in UPA, along with their families," \collectivization activists," agri-
cultural specialists dispatched from East Ukraine, peasants who conceded to Soviet grain
requisitions or failed to deliver food supplies to the UPA, and civilians who paid government
duties, voted in local elections or were even slightly suspected of treason (Statiev 2010, 124;
Dyukov et al. 2009, 16-17). While this violence was selective by intent, the overwhelming
majority (74 percent) of the insurgent attacks in Figure 7 were directed at civilians.
If the OUN selected this approach on the expectation of civilian bandwagoning, this
assumption at first proved justied. As one participant wrote, \there is no point in doing
political work in areas ... where [the OUN] perpetrates such violence" (Statiev, 2010, 129).
The proportion of insurgents voluntarily surrendering to Soviet authorities (as opposed to
those killed in action or captured) declined from 32 per cent to 16 per cent between 1945 and
1946.26 In an environment of constant terror, the Soviets had great diculty raising local
cadres. Some rayon-level administrations operated with less than half of essential personnel,
with no courts, prosecutors and an understaed district NKVD oce (Burds, 1997, 113-114).
The resulting inability to collect reliable intelligence nullied Soviet advantages in repower
and excluded the types of selective violence that could eradicate the OUN's network of small
cells. Instead, the NKVD continued a strategic emphasis on massive operations that did not
depend on the ow of actionable intelligence from local informants. As of mid-1946, the vast
majority of insurgent actions went uninvestigated and three-fourths of all NKVD operations
resulted in no contact with the enemy.27
Around the same time, however, civilian strategy began to shift. As noted in an NKVD
situation report from March 1946, \The population signicantly altered its attitude toward
the OUN [...] We have recorded a number of cases where local residents oered direct as-
sistance to [our] forces in locating and liquidating the bandits [and] refused to deliver food
to the bandits. Many bandits, witnessing the change [...] and fearing being surrendered to
25TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 23, D. 2967, L. 25.
26TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 23, D. 2967, L. 25. 171.
27TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 23, D. 2966.
28organs of Soviet power, relocate to other rayons and villages where no one knows them."28
This shift from bandwagoning to balancing enabled the NKVD to greatly expand its infor-
mant network and, after an internal review in January 1947, adopt a strategy that depended
on more selective forms of violence (Vladimirtsev and Kokurin, 2008, 369).
As the Soviets consolidated control in 1947-1950, the strategy prole gradually converged
to (BL;L;H). Having conducted an initial census of families of suspected and known OUN
members as early as March 1944, the NKVD and its successor, the MVD, greatly escalated
the practice of forcible deportations in 1947.29 Whereas deportations elsewhere in the Soviet
Union, particularly in the North Caucasus, were notorious for indiscriminately uprooting
hundreds of thousands of civilians on the sole principle of nationality, the deportations in
the borderlands were of a more selective character. They were smaller, more frequent, and
mostly limited to guerrilla relatives and active supporters. Whereas the national deporta-
tions were largely unconditional applications of brute force, the new deportations were used
as instruments of compellence, often avoidable if wayward relatives surrendered to author-
ities (Statiev, 2005). While earlier waves of guerilla deportations were generally limited to
500 families or less, these policies would now assume a massive scale: the first wave of large-
scale deportations in autumn 1947 relocated 26,644 guerilla families, or 76,192 individuals.30
As the scale of Soviet punishment rose to unprecedented heights, authorities were careful
not to provoke a new backlash among the population. Excesses and cases of civilian casual-
ties were promptly blamed on inept local ocials and the nationalist underground (Burds,
1997, 128-129). In some cases, security forces sought to exploit the population's balancing
tendencies by conducting raids on villages while dressed as UPA insurgents. Yet by 1949
even this practice would be abandoned as \blatantly provocative and imprudent."31 Mean-
while, the MVD expanded its eorts to `Ukrainize' the conict by recruiting local cadres
for administrative positions, paramilitary `extermination battalions' and self-defense forces.
The authorities were able to greatly expand their network of informants on the local level,
recruiting numerous UPA defectors and captured insurgents. These improved intelligence
assets helped the Soviets overcome identication problems, avoid excessive casualties among
civilians, while inicting heavy losses on OUN leadership, most notably the UPA's supreme
commander Roman Shukhevych, who was killed in an MVD ambush in March 1950.
As the Soviets became able to target insurgents with increased accuracy, the OUN found
28RGVA, F. 38650, Op. 1, D. 145, L. 121-6.
29GARF, F. R-9401, Op. 2, D. 64, L. 216-218.
30GARF, F. R-9401, Op. 2, D. 199, L. 232-236.
31TsDAGOU, F. 1, Op. 16, D. 68, L. 9-17.
29itself increasingly isolated. By 1949 the nationalists' military capabilities had been greatly
diminished. Desertion and suicide rates were high, and internal revolts against commanders
became frequent (Koval, 2003, 73). The principal targets of insurgent punishment remained
civilians, who were often raided for no discernible purpose other than the insurgents' own
subsistence. At the end of 1949, the OUN supreme leadership ordered a general demobi-
lization of UPA and a halt to all guerilla activity (Tys-Krokhmaliuk, 1972, 310). While the
MVD continued its policy of targeted arrests and assassinations against remaining pockets
of die-hard nationalists, the West Ukrainian insurgency had eectively been defeated.
7 Conclusion
The preceding analysis explored the logic behind two responses to civil war violence: bal-
ancing against the side that inicts the most costs, and bandwagoning with it. Using an
epidemic model of popular support dynamics and solution concepts from game theory, I
showed that { in a world of perfect information { security-minded civilians are always better
off balancing, and neither the insurgents nor the government has an incentive to escalate the
use of force. Bandwagoning, which encourages escalation, is inecient.
Unfortunately, this is not the world we live in. If combatants are unsure of how civilians
respond to punishment, the balancing equilibrium breaks down and high levels of violence
can emerge. Where territorial control is evenly divided between insurgents and the govern-
ment, expectations of civilian bandwagoning create incentives for two-sided violence. Where
one side has incomplete territorial control, violence by the weaker combatant is likely. Where
one side has complete control, violence by the stronger combatant is likely.
These propositions dier from the emerging conventional wisdom (Kalyvas, 2006), which
expects (a) violence in divided and fully-controlled areas to be off the equilibrium path, and
(b) selective violence in areas of incomplete control to be perpetrated by the stronger com-
batant. Both of these expectations are built on the assumption that civilians always balance.
The epidemic model shares Kalyvas' scope conditions and underlying logic { about the role
of civilian cooperation in the production of selective violence, about the relationship between
identication and territorial control, about the role of survival in civilian decision-making.
However, the model accommodates both types of civilian behavior and shows that { once the
balancing assumption is loosened { civilian victimization is not always counterproductive.
Insurgents in a position of weakness have incentives to terrorize civilians. Violence between
two equally-matched combatants can become a competitive killing spree.
30Given the risks of escalation, why would civilians ever choose to bandwagon? Survival,
as the epidemic model relates, is a shot in the dark. By the time civilians respond to the use
or non-use of punishment, the blood will have already been spilt. Given the same level of
violence, a civilian who balances bears the same costs as one who bandwagons. In making
this choice, civilians do not directly control their own fate; they shape incentives for violence.
How combatants respond to these incentives depends on whether civilian strategy can be
clearly communicated, and whether the initial balance of power is symmetric, uneven or mo-
nopolistic. Where their strategy choice is not public knowledge, civilians have great diculty
realizing, much less exploiting their own leverage as kingmakers. In a virtual setting and
empirically, civilians have trouble coalescing around a single, unied strategy and tend to
realize the benets of balancing when it is too late: after combatants have already begun to
capitalize on bandwagoning through escalation. Neither rational cost-minimizing behavior
nor an evolutionary process of trial-and-error is sucient to shake this dynamic.
Absent a reliable enforcement mechanism, it is dicult to see how bandwagoning can be
avoided on a group level. Our best hope may be to make its consequences less extreme. As
simulations suggest, civilian casualties decline as one side consolidates its control and vio-
lence becomes more selective. If we are only interested in protecting civilians from their own
worst instincts, the simplest policy solution may be to choose a side, help ensure its decisive
victory, and let civilians find safety in the shadow of the Leviathan. Without improvements
in intelligence gathering, strategic evaluation and outreach to the local community { the
underlying challenges that make civilian strategy so dicult to discern and communicate
{ even such extreme solutions may prove insucient. As a first step, we should acknowl-
edge that bandwagoning is a frequent feature of civil conict, and try to identify potential
patterns of violence that we may otherwise overlook or underpredict.
Appendix A: Equilibrium stability analysis
The stability of the insurgent victory equilibrium in (8) can be shown through the lineariza-
tion of the system in (2-4). Let J1 be the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated at fixed
point (8):
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31with I;G as dened in (1). The equilibrium point (8) is stable if all the eigenvalues of J1
have negative real parts. In order for this to be true, we must have det(J1) > 0;trace(J1) < 0.
This condition holds as long as RI > RG and any one of the following is true: (a)  = 0;I =
0;G = 1;G = 1=2, (b)  = 0;I = 1;G = 1;G < 1=2, (c)  = 1;I = 1;G = 0;G = 1=2,
(d)  = 1;I = 1;G = 1;G > 1=2.
A similar approach can be used to prove the stability of the government victory equilib-
rium in (9). Let J2 be the Jacobian matrix of the system in (2-4) evaluated at fixed point
(9):
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The equilibrium point (9) is stable if det(J2) > 0;trace(J2) < 0. This condition holds as
long as RI < RG and any one of the following is true: (a)  = 0;I = 1;G = 0;G = 1=2,
(b)  = 0;I = 1;G = 1;G > 1=2, (c)  = 1;I = 0;G = 1;G = 1=2, (d)  = 1;I =
1;G = 1;G < 1=2.
Appendix B: Archival abbreviations
GARF: State Archives of the Russian Federation, Moscow.
RGVA: Russian State Military Archive, Moscow.
TsDAGOU: Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Kyiv.
F: file (fond); Op: catalog (opis'); D: case (delo); L: page (list).
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